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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-3475 
____________ 
 
ZEFFIE NETIA SURGICK; CORDELIA JOHNSON 
 
       
 
v. 
 
ACQUANETTA CIRELLA; ROSE SURGICK;  
K. HOVNANIAN ENTERPRISES, INC.,  
C/O ACQUANETTA CIRELLA [IN THE MATTER  
OF JAMES LESLIE SURGICK (DECEASED)]; 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
 
Zeffie Surgick,  
                Appellant 
 __________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 09-cv-03807) 
District Judge: Noel L. Hillman 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 10, 2013 
 
Before: AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, 
 
Circuit Judges  
(Opinion filed:  January 14, 2013) 
_________________ 
 
OPINION 
_________________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Zeffie Surgick and Cordelia Johnson, now deceased, brought suit pro se 
against Acquanetta Cirella, Rose Surgick, K. Hovnanian Enterprises, Inc., and the 
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Internal Revenue Service (“the Service”) in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey after Surgick unsuccessfully sought information directly from the 
Service, see 26 U.S.C. § 6103(e).  Surgick and Johnson claimed that the defendants 
denied them access to tax records and other information relating to the estate of their 
father, James Leslie Surgick, and thereby violated their First Amendment and statutory 
rights to freedom of information.  In addition, they alleged that Cirella and Rose Surgick, 
in exercising power of attorney over the estate, conspired to defraud them by concealing 
the value of the estate, in violation of New Jersey law.1
In an order filed on June 15, 2010, the District Court granted K. Hovnanian’s 
motion to dismiss and advised Surgick and Johnson to amend their complaint with 
respect to the Service.  K. Hovnanian had argued, and the District Court agreed, that, as a 
private corporation, it was not subject to the Freedom of Information or Privacy Acts, and 
it had no legal obligation to the plaintiffs to disclose its tax records.   
 
In August, 2010, Surgick and Johnson filed an amended complaint, alleging that 
the Service violated the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) by withholding 
information pertaining to James Leslie Surgick and his estate, and his investment 
interests.  In a June 19, 2011 Opinion, the District Court recognized that dismissal of the 
amended complaint should probably be granted to the extent that the plaintiffs sought 
disclosure from the Service of K. Hovnanian’s tax information, but the court was 
concerned about FOIA’s segregation requirement.  Additionally, the District Court 
recognized that representations made by the Service that its officials had conducted a 
reasonable investigation for the documents requested; discovered that most of those 
                                              
1 Zeffie Surgick, Cordelia Johnson, Rose Surgick and Acquanetta Cirella are four of 
James Leslie Surgick’s 12 children. 
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documents were either destroyed or did not exist; and had provided the documents it did 
have, should be presented in a motion for summary judgment.   
In August, 2011, the Service moved for summary judgment, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 
56(a), arguing that the plaintiffs did not have a valid FOIA claim regarding the tax 
documents of James Leslie Surgick and his estate, and that it was entitled to summary 
judgment regarding the request for the tax return information for K. Hovnanian because 
K. Hovnanian had not consented to disclosure and because its tax records were exempt 
from disclosure.  Cirella and Rose Surgick filed a motion to dismiss the amended 
complaint for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. 
In an order entered on March 29, 2012, the District Court granted summary 
judgment to the Service.  After a careful review of the specific information requested and 
the Service’s declarations and exhibits regarding its investigation and actions, and the 
response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the District Court 
determined that there was no triable issue with respect to whether the Service was 
improperly withholding information from the plaintiffs.  In a thorough opinion, the 
District Court concluded that the Service provided reasonable and sufficiently detailed 
declarations of two Disclosure Specialists, and that those declarations established that all 
files likely to contain responsive materials were searched.  Officials had followed up on 
the results of the searches by working with the Federal Records Center to locate any 
responsive documents, and the Service had provided the plaintiffs with the only 
responsive documents that were located.  The Service had also properly advised the 
plaintiffs that the majority of the requests sought records which were destroyed in 
accordance with the Service’s record retention schedule, were nonexistent, or were never 
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filed with the Service.  In addition, the District Court determined that summary judgment 
was proper on the plaintiffs’ requests regarding K. Hovnanian's tax information.  The 
plaintiffs had not obtained K. Hovnanian’s consent to disclosure, and FOIA’s segregation 
requirement did not apply because the documents sought were fully exempt from 
disclosure and did not contain any non-exempt information that the Service could 
segregate and disclose.  In the margin, the court concluded that there was no need for a 
“Vaughn index.”  See Surgick v. Cirella
Because the FOIA claim was dismissed, and there thus was no longer a federal 
question, the District Court, in addition, sua sponte declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice, 28 
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).  However, because the plaintiffs were proceeding pro se, the District 
Court gave them one final opportunity to amend the complaint to allege a basis for 
diversity jurisdiction over defendants Cirella and Rose Zurgick. 
, 2012 WL 1067923 (D.N.J. March 29, 2012). 
 Surgick and Cordelia Johnson’s daughter Charlotte Surgick responded by filing an 
amended complaint, again claiming that Cirella and Rose Surgick denied them their 
rightful inheritance.2  In an order entered on April 27, 2012, the District Court noted that 
ninety days had passed since the court was notified of Cordelia’s death, and the issue 
whether Charlotte could be substituted under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 25(a)(1) had not been 
properly addressed in a substitution motion.  Accordingly, the court dismissed Cordelia’s 
claims.3
                                              
2 Cordelia Surgick died in November, 2011. 
  The District Court then signaled its intention to dismiss Surgick’s amended 
3 Rule 25(a)(1) provides: “If a party dies and the claim is not extinguished, the court may 
order substitution of the proper party.  A motion for substitution may be made by any 
party or by the decedent’s successor or representative.  If the motion is not made within 
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complaint against Cirella and Rose Surgick on the basis of the probate exception to 
federal court jurisdiction, see generally Three Keys Ltd. v. SR Utility Holding Co.
 Surgick, in response, moved to withdraw her amended complaint against Cirella 
and Rose Surgick; she also filed a notice of appeal on May 14, 2012, seeking review of 
the District Court’s March 29, 2012 order granting summary judgment to the Service.  
We dismissed the appeal on July 12, 2012 as premature, 
, 540 
F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2008).  Surgick was given one more extension of twenty days in which 
to properly plead a basis for federal court jurisdiction. 
see C.A. No. 12-2409, because 
Cirella and Rose Surgick remained parties to the action and because the order appealed 
had not been certified by the District Court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 54(b).  In an 
order entered on July 19, 2012, the District Court granted the motion to withdraw the 
amended complaint and finally dismissed the claims against Cirella and Rose Surgick, 
thereby bringing the case to a close.  Surgick had sixty days from the date of this order in 
which to file a timely notice of appeal, see
Meanwhile, on August 28, 2012, Surgick filed a petition for panel rehearing in our 
court in her jurisdictionally defective appeal, 
 Fed. R. App. Pro. 4(a)(1)(B) (authorizing 60-
day appeal period when United States is party).  No notice of appeal was filed by 
September 17, 2012.  Instead, she filed a notice of appeal on  October 16, 2012. 
see C.A. No. 12-2409, which we denied.  
But she also mailed a copy of her rehearing petition to the District Court, where it was 
treated as a notice of appeal and filed on August 30, 2012.  It was forwarded to this 
Court, resulting in the instant appeal.  Our Clerk granted Surgick leave to appeal in forma 
pauperis
                                                                                                                                                  
90 days after service of a statement noting the death, the action by or against the decedent 
must be dismissed.” 
 and advised her that the appeal was subject to summary dismissal under 28 
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U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or summary affirmance under Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 
10.6. 
The Service has moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and K. 
Hovnanian Enterprises has submitted a letter joining in that motion.  The Service argues 
that the notice of appeal filed on October 16, 2012 was not timely filed under appellate 
Rule 4, and the petition for rehearing which the Clerk of the District Court treated as a 
notice of appeal, although timely filed under Rule 4, should not be treated as a notice of 
appeal.  In support, the Service argues that Surgick, although appearing pro se, is not an 
unsophisticated litigant.  When the jurisdictional defect in the appeal docketed at C.A. 
No. 12-2409 was called to her attention, for example, she moved to withdraw the 
amended complaint against Cirella and Rose Surgick.  Moreover, Surgick knows the 
proper format for a notice of appeal, having previously filed one.  Surgick has filed a 
motion to strike, in which she argues, in effect, that we should exercise jurisdiction in the 
instant appeal. 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) provides that a notice of appeal specify 
the party taking the appeal, designate the order being appealed, and name the court to 
which the appeal is taken.  Fed. R. App. Pro. 3(c)(1)(A)-(C).  “Form 1 in the Appendix of 
Forms is a suggested notice of appeal.”  See id. at Rule 3(c)(5).  Without a doubt, 
Surgick’s petition for panel rehearing does not conform to Form 1, but if a document 
filed within the time specified by Rule 4 gives the notice required by Rule 3, it is 
effective as a notice of appeal.  Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992).  The 
requirements of Rule 3 are to be construed liberally, but “Rule 3’s dictates are 
jurisdictional in nature, and their satisfaction is a prerequisite to appellate review.”  Id.  In 
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Smith
Not surprisingly, Surgick’s petition for panel rehearing which was filed on the 
District Court docket on August 30, 2012 as a notice of appeal references on page 1 
Surgick’s existing appeal to our Court (without identifying the specific court of appeals 
docket number), and indicates an intent to have review of the District Court’s order of 
March 29, 2012.  On the second page of the petition, Surgick notes that her case became 
appealable upon entry of the District Court’s July 19, 2012 order dismissing the 
remaining claims against Cirella and Rose Surgick, and she notes that she “now” appeals 
the order of the District Court denying her claim against the Service for disclosure of 
records.  Under these circumstances, we conclude that Rule 3(c)(1) is satisfied, and that 
we have jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
, the Supreme Court held that an inmate’s informal brief, submitted in response to a 
briefing order, could qualify as a notice of appeal; the case was remanded to the appeals 
court. 
We will summarily affirm the District Court’s order granting summary judgment 
in favor of the Service and against Zeffie Surgick.  Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and 
I.O.P. 10.6, we may summarily dispose of an appeal when it clearly appears that no 
substantial question is presented by the appeal.  Summary judgment is appropriate where 
the moving party shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 
322 (1986).  Although the initial burden is on the moving party to show the absence of a 
genuine issue of material fact, the burden on the moving party may be discharged by 
showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.  See 
id. at 325.  Thus, to withstand a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the 
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nonmoving party must identify specific facts and affirmative evidence that contradict that 
which is offered by the moving party.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
257 (1986).  A party opposing summary judgment must do more than just rest upon mere 
allegations.  See Saldana v. Kmart Corp.
 A District Court may order the production of documents pursuant to FOIA, 5 
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), where (1) the requested documents are agency records; (2) the 
records have been withheld by the agency; and (3) the withholding was improper.  
, 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001). 
See 
Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 644 F.2d 969, 974 (3d Cir. 1981).  The 
agency has a duty to conduct a reasonable search for responsive records.  See Abdelfattah 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 488 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 2007).  To establish for 
summary judgment purposes the adequacy of its search, the agency should provide a 
“reasonably detailed affidavit, setting forth the search terms and the type of search 
performed, and averring that all files likely to contain responsive materials  . . . were 
searched.”  Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army
 With respect to James Leslie Surgick and his estate, the plaintiffs sought tax 
returns and records for numerous years.  Based on the record in this case, the Service 
established that it complied with its duty to conduct an adequate search of its Integrated 
Data Retrieval System and to turn over all responsive documents in its possession.  
Surgick failed to identify specific facts and affirmative evidence to contradict the 
evidence offered by the Service in support of its argument that its search was adequate 
and it was not improperly withholding documents.  Thus, summary judgment was proper.   
, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
With respect to K. Hovnanian, the plaintiffs sought corporate tax returns and 
information concerning James Leslie Surgick’s interests in the corporation.  Pursuant to 
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FOIA exemption 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), and the tax code, 26 U.S.C § 6103(e)(1), the 
Service is prohibited from releasing K. Hovnanian’s tax information to the plaintiffs 
without K. Hovnanian’s consent, which the plaintiffs did not obtain.  Section 
6103(e)(1)(A)-(F) prohibits the disclosure of third-party tax return information, and 
subparagraph (b)(2) broadly defines “return information” to include a “taxpayer's 
identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income, payments, receipts, deductions, 
exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld, deficiencies, 
over assessments, or tax payments …,” id. at 6103(b)(2).  Accordingly, summary 
judgment was proper here as well.  FOIA’s segregation requirement, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) 
(unnumbered paragraph) (any “reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be 
provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are 
exempt under this subsection”), is not applicable because the Service established that the 
information requested is exempt from disclosure, and established that there was no form 
of non-exempt information in the documents requested which the Service could segregate 
and legally disclose to the plaintiffs.  See Church of Scientology v. Internal Revenue 
Serv., 484 U.S. 9, 16 (1987) (“Congress did not intend [section 6103] to allow the 
disclosure of otherwise confidential return information merely by the redaction of 
identifying details.”).  A “Vaughn index,” see Vaughn v. Rosen
 For the foregoing reasons, the order of the District Court granting summary 
judgment to the Internal Revenue Service and against Zeffie Surgick on her FOIA claim 
is summarily affirmed.  The Service’s and K. Hovnanian’s motions to dismiss for lack of 
, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 
1973), was unnecessary because the information sought plainly was confidential taxpayer 
information. 
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appellate jurisdiction are denied.  Surgick’s motion to strike is denied as stated but has 
been considered as a jurisdictional response. 
